M5：百工与司命——能力注册表、授契行契请命、禁域裁决与观察标证

- 百工域 domains/baigong：capabilities（统一能力契约：执行类型 builtin/qiankun/mcp/http + 四维风险标注 + 来源版本）、mandates（授契 grant / 行契 charter 预算时间窗，撤销立即生效）、tool_calls（净化摘要 + 观察标证）；请命复用 pending_confirmations 加 expires_at/brief_json（超时=拒绝执行 HJ-1302，六要素说明）
- 司命裁决器 siming.py：四维取最高档（能力/数据/后果/情境）；禁域为代码常量不可配置（递归删根/格式化/写裸设备/fork 炸弹、file:// 协议、密钥材料外发）——专项测试断言恶意标注与篡改对象仍拒 HJ-1301
- 执行链：禁域→裁决（HJ-1303 未授契拒且双留痕）→请命→执行（乾坤经 SandboxClient HMAC；MCP 经 call_tool；内置无副作用）→净化标证（观察非事实，敏感遮蔽+体量截断）→行动账
- MCP 登记/启停/刷新自动派生与撤下 capabilities（博闻登记接入点）；内置能力种子（echo/datetime/qiankun.shell/web.fetch）
- 端点：/capabilities /mandates /petitions /tool-calls + /tools 兼容投影；前端百工页四区（能力目录四维标注/授契行契/请命批准拒绝/行动账观察标证）
- 退役：modules/safety|skills|tool_runtime|agent、application/tool_runtime、services/skills|safety、tool_policies/skills/model_endpoint_overrides 表（迁移 006）、前端 SkillManager/ToolsConsole/旧 tools 页
- 验收（test_baigong_siming 四用例）：未授契被拒留痕、请命超时不执行、禁域不可关闭、结果为观察不入忆；后端 454、前端 220、BFF 4、神识 5 包全绿（2 个预存环境失败不变）

backend/app/domains/baigong/files.py

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+"""乾坤沙箱工作区文件读取（百工执行产物预览）。
+
+隔离前缀语义：workspace/<subject>/（subject=character_id，一角色一持久工作区）；
+subject 经白名单替换杜绝路径注入，沙箱端另有 canonicalize 校验兜底。
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+import uuid
+
+from app.integrations.sandbox.auth import AuthorizationContext
+from app.integrations.sandbox.client import SandboxClient
+from app.integrations.sandbox.models import (
+    DirEntry,
+    FileListRequest,
+    FileReadRequest,
+    FileReadResponse,
+)
+
+_ISOLATE_SAFE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]")
+
+
+def isolate_workdir(
+    base: str | None,
+    *,
+    subject_id: str | None,
+    run_id: str | None,
+    trace_id: str | None,
+) -> str:
+    """把工作区根目录隔离到主体级子目录，防跨主体信息泄漏。"""
+    root = base or "workspace"
+    key = subject_id or run_id or trace_id or f"adhoc_{uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]}"
+    safe = _ISOLATE_SAFE.sub("_", key).strip("._-") or "adhoc"
+    return f"{root}/{safe}"
+
+
+async def read_sandbox_file(
+    sandbox: SandboxClient,
+    path: str,
+    *,
+    run_id: str | None = None,
+    character_id: str | None = None,
+    trace_id: str | None = None,
+    isolated: bool = True,
+) -> FileReadResponse:
+    effective = path
+    if isolated:
+        workdir = isolate_workdir("workspace", subject_id=character_id, run_id=run_id, trace_id=trace_id)
+        effective = f"{workdir}/{path.lstrip('/')}"
+    return await sandbox.file_read(
+        FileReadRequest(path=effective),
+        AuthorizationContext(
+            trace_id=trace_id or str(uuid.uuid4()),
+            risk_level="L0",
+            tool="file_read",
+            character_id=character_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+async def list_sandbox_dir(
+    sandbox: SandboxClient,
+    path: str = ".",
+    *,
+    run_id: str | None = None,
+    character_id: str | None = None,
+    trace_id: str | None = None,
+    isolated: bool = True,
+) -> list[DirEntry]:
+    effective = path
+    if isolated:
+        workdir = isolate_workdir("workspace", subject_id=character_id, run_id=run_id, trace_id=trace_id)
+        effective = f"{workdir}/{path.lstrip('/')}"
+    result = await sandbox.file_list(
+        FileListRequest(path=effective),
+        AuthorizationContext(
+            trace_id=trace_id or str(uuid.uuid4()),
+            risk_level="L0",
+            tool="file_list",
+            character_id=character_id,
+            run_id=run_id,
+        ),
+    )
+    return result.entries